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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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
9 MAY 1973

**FBIS**

# **TRENDS**

**in Communist Propaganda**

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


**Confidential**

9 MAY 1973  
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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 30 APRIL - 6 MAY 1973

Moscow (2229 items)

May Day, CPSU Plenum	(14%)	39%
[Brezhnev May Day Speech]	(--)	15%
Lenin Peace Prizes	(--)	11%
China	(5%)	3%
Soviet Press Day	(--)	3%
Indochina	(4%)	2%

Peking (1099 items)

Domestic Issues	(20%)	50%
May Day	(--)	17%
Cambodia	(4%)	9%
Vietnam	(4%)	4%
PRC Friendship	(3%)	3%
Delegation in Japan		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi continues to respond to U.S. warnings against further communist violations of the Vietnamese peace agreement with assertions that the Vietnamese people will not be "intimidated." President Nixon's remarks on Vietnam in his annual foreign policy report to Congress were denounced, along with other statements by Administration spokesman, as part of a U.S. campaign of "slander" and "threats" aimed at covering up or justifying U.S. violations of the accord and preparing public opinion for more serious violations.

Hanoi announced on 6 May that on the 4th the 27 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement condemning alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the peace agreement had been forwarded to the participants in the 12-power Paris conference on Vietnam. Hanoi noted further that the foreign ministry had asked the participants to urge that these violations cease and that the agreement be scrupulously implemented; a similar request for international action had appeared in the PRG and DRV notes of 14 and 16 April to the international conference participants.

Moscow and Peking duly reported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 27th as well as the earlier PRG and DRV notes, but neither has responded to the Vietnamese communist appeals to the international conference participants. In line with this silence, Moscow and Peking have also ignored the response to the DRV contained in the 24 April U.S. note to the conference participants.

## DRV SAYS NIXON "SLANDER" AIMED AT COVERING ALLIED VIOLATIONS

The President's 3 May report to Congress on foreign policy was assessed promptly in articles in Hanoi's party paper NHAN DAN as merely the latest example of attempts by the United States to deflect attention from its own violations of the peace accord by claiming that the DRV has committed major violations. An article in the paper on the 4th assailed the President for threatening that the DRV risks "revived confrontation with the United States" and might "destroy the chances for a new and constructive bilateral relationship, including economic assistance."

In an article on the 5th NHAN DAN cited Western news agencies as calling the President's remarks the strongest U.S. warning since the signing of the peace agreement and added its own observation

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that the report represents a new escalation in the recent "policy of intimidation" by U.S. spokesmen. Hanoi failed to indicate the specific nature of the President's charges against the DRV, with the NHAN DAN article on the 5th saying merely that the report "completely distorted the truth about the situation in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." However, Liberation Radio commentaries did note that complaints about DRV behavior included the charge that North Vietnamese troops were still being sent into South Vietnam and were continuing military activities in Cambodia and Laos.

In reiterating the persistent line that U.S. "intimidation" would not succeed, the 4 May NHAN DAN article cited Premier Pham Van Dong's assertions in his May Day speech that "no brutal force, no perfidious scheme, no insolent threat" can make the Vietnamese people deviate from "the path of struggle which is our path to victory." An article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 5th reminded the President that the U.S. "carrot-and-stick policy" had not been successful in Vietnam.

Hanoi has not broached the question of possible talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho since 28 April, when it publicized a communique from the DRV embassy in Paris saying the embassy had no information on press reports that such a meeting would be held. However, NHAN DAN seemed to strike a negative note when in the 4 May article on the President's foreign policy report it injected a criticism of Deputy Assistant Secretary William Sullivan for saying Hanoi must choose between a path of implementing the agreement or a path which would revert to the "unfortunate military situation." The article, as reviewed by VNA, made no reference to Sullivan's 27-30 April meetings in Paris with DRV Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach--meetings billed by U.S. spokesmen as preparatory for a Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meeting in mid-May. Hanoi has ignored Kissinger's 2 May statement to reporters that there is an agreement that there should be a meeting but no agreement on such details as the timing of the announcement.

WATERGATE                      Vietnamese communist media were slow in reacting  
DEVELOPMENTS                  to disclosures in the Watergate case, with the  
                                 first report coming in a Hanoi radio broadcast  
on 24 April--a full week after the President's statement of the  
17th. Hanoi's initial silence may have been related to developments  
in DRV-U.S. relations or may have merely reflected caution in  
evaluating the significance of the case. Hanoi's publicity has been

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confined to routine-level radio and press accounts, with no authoritative press comment. In keeping with the pattern since the signing of the peace agreement, Hanoi's treatment of the President has been devoid of the kind of personal invective that had been a staple of DRV comment during the war years. Reports on Watergate have been critical of the President, but derogatory references have generally been attributed to the Western press.

Since the 24th there has been an increasing flow of daily Hanoi attention to Watergate. Typifying Hanoi's relative circumspection, however, Hanoi's first lengthy report, broadcast in Vietnamese on the 28th, cited Western news agencies for the allegations that "Nixon has become furious as his role in the Watergate case is being tracked down" and that "the activities of the White House are virtually paralyzed." Hanoi's reports on the President's 30 April speech to the nation included a 3 May broadcast which did go so far as to claim that he had "admitted part of the guilt" in the Watergate affair. It cited various alleged U.S. news commentaries, including one speculating that the President had participated in a coverup and another that he might resign.

A two-part radio commentary, broadcast in Vietnamese on 7 and 8 May, offered Hanoi's first extensive analysis of the affair. Reviewing events over the past year, the commentary judged Watergate to be a "great political loss" for the President and his Administration which "not only threatens the President's prestige but also threatens his leadership of the nation."

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## U.S. ACCUSED OF USING ICCS AIR CORRIDORS FOR RECONNAISSANCE

Hanoi and the PRG have reacted to charges that ICCS helicopters were fired on in Quang Tri on 2 May by countercharging that the United States that day had sent a reconnaissance plane into the ICCS corridor to conduct espionage activities. Protesting the incident promptly on the 2d, a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, as broadcast by Liberation Radio in Vietnamese, said the reconnaissance plane had been met with "punishing fire."\* Elaborating on the incident, a 3 May Hanoi broadcast said that the plane was a "pilotless reconnaissance aircraft," and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 4th claimed that it had been flying at the altitude, time, and flight path set for ICCS aircraft. Communist comment on the incident for the most part has failed to directly acknowledge charges that the ICCS helicopters were fired upon, but Liberation Radio on 7 May quoted the spokesman of the PRG delegation to the JMC as saying at a press conference on the 5th that the United States had "slanderosly" accused the liberation armed forces of firing on the helicopters.

The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement not only protested that the United States had misused the ICCS corridor but also charged that it had violated Article 4 of the Paris agreement and demanded that it "put an immediate end to its reconnaissance flights over PRG-controlled areas." Article 4 does not specify an end to reconnaissance activities in stating generally that the United States "will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam." Some recent propaganda has also complained about GVN aerial reconnaissance, but there has been no effort as yet to press claims that this is a violation of the peace accord.

The 4 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article which discussed the 2 May incident also responded to Canadian demands for changes in the regulations on the ICCS air corridors. The army paper declared: "If the United States and the Saigon administration scrupulously implement the cease-fire and do not use impostor aircraft bearing the ICCS or the JMC insignia to carry out illegal acts, it is certain that this question does not need to be raised."

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\* A VNA English report of the statement said the plane had been shot at and "punished," and a Liberation Radio broadcast in English referred to it as "downed" as well as "punished." Whether the terms were being used synonymously is not clear. But perhaps because no plane was downed, a VNA English transmission of the statement on the 3d changed the phrase to "chased away."

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## DRV JOURNAL OFFERS CANDID REVIEW OF COMMUNIST STRATEGY

In the March issue of the DRV party journal HOC TAP an alternate member of the Central Committee, Hoang Tung, provided an unusually candid evaluation of the significance of the Paris agreement and of the many phases of the communist struggle leading up to it. The article is similar to one by Hoang Tung in HOC TAP last October--which analyzed the 1972 spring offensive--in its view of the Vietnam war as symbolic of the world confrontation between the communist forces and the United States and as a major element affecting the development of the confrontation. Hanoi radio drew attention to the March HOC TAP article by broadcasting it in installments on 24-26 April. And the April issue of the journal published another article by Hoang Tung entitled "Our Great Victory and New Task," which is not yet available in translation.

The appearance of the three articles within a few months of each other is the more notable in that Hoang Tung had authored no previous HOC TAP article since July 1964, when he also wrote on questions of strategy in Vietnam and the world. He has been active over the past eight years, however, in his many roles in the propaganda apparatus--as editor in chief of the party paper NHAN DAN, deputy chief of the Central Committee's Department of Propaganda and Training, and president of the Vietnam Journalists Association. In addition, articles by him appeared in both NHAN DAN and the journal of the Propaganda and Training Department, TUYEN HUAN, including a series of articles on strategy which were published in NHAN DAN in March and April 1965. It is possible that the recent appearance of Hoang Tung's articles in HOC TAP is related to the fact that TUYEN HUAN was discontinued in December 1972 with an announcement that its tasks would be undertaken by HOC TAP and NHAN DAN.

In the past, articles in TUYEN HUAN were frequently marked by a candor not typical of HOC TAP or other party organs. It is a similarly straightforward approach that distinguishes Hoang Tung's March HOC TAP article from other DRV discussions. For example:

+ In explaining the reason for the convergence of worldwide forces in Vietnam, Hoang Tung stated that the struggles for nationalism, democracy, and socialism are all present in Vietnam and that "once the historic task of the national democratic revolution has been completed, it is essential to move toward socialism." Such a frank acknowledgment of Hanoi's ultimate aim of imposing communism throughout Vietnam is unusual.

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This goal is normally reflected only implicitly in Hanoi statements advocating completion of the national democratic revolution in the South and the eventual "peaceful reunification of the fatherland."

+ Hoang Tung's assessment of the Paris agreement was not limited to the usual Hanoi formulation that it was a "great victory" but that other goals remained to be achieved. Instead, atypically, he pointed out that the settlement did not represent a "complete" victory but only "the greatest victory we could win considering the actual balance of forces between us and the enemy."

It is not clear from the context whether Hoang Tung's reference to the current balance of forces applied to the situation in Indochina or in the world as a whole. However, in what could be read as an analogy to the current situation, he claimed elsewhere that the failure of the earlier wars in Korea and Vietnam to unify those countries was due to the "stalemate" between the international "revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces."

+ In discussing the 1968 Tet offensive, Hoang Tung went further than other communist comment in suggesting that the communists had hoped it might lead to final victory. He said they had decided that they might, through a major military effort, force the allies to deescalate "if not to end" the war. He also candidly acknowledged setbacks following the offensive, noting that in 1969 the revolutionary forces "were temporarily driven off . . . at a number of places . . . ."

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## PEKING MARKS RGNU ANNIVERSARY, HERALDS SIHANOUK'S TOUR ABROAD

Peking marked the third anniversary of the formation of Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) by giving a boost to the prince while keeping a discreet arm's distance from Cambodian developments. In a changed format, the Chinese leaders' message on the 4th was addressed from PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Premier Chou En-lai to Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth. Previous messages on this occasion were from Chou to Penn Nouth. In addition to adding Sihanouk as a recipient, this year's message hailed the "historic significance" of his trip to Cambodia, indicating that the message was designed to enhance Sihanouk's role in what it called the RGNU's "increasingly high international prestige." On the 7th Chou hosted a banquet honoring Sihanouk and his Khmer Rouge shadow Ieng Sary on the occasion of their departure the next day on a tour of nine African and European countries.

While lending support to Sihanouk internationally, the Chinese have expressed only minimal backing for the Cambodian insurgents' political and military objectives. The leaders' message omitted last year's call for the insurgents to persevere in people's war and avoided any reference to the United States. Chou's message last year denounced the United States for trying to "Khmerize" the war and engaging in "military adventures and political schemes." Chou had also posited the goal of "the complete independence and liberation" of Cambodia, but this year's message referred more vaguely to a "final victory" while predicting that "the traitorous Lon Nol clique" is isolated and "definitely will not last for long."

There was also no repetition of last year's accompanying NCNA report rounding up the achievements of the Cambodian "people's war" and warning that "certain powers" were seeking to split the insurgents' front. That NCNA report had hailed Sihanouk's recent "powerful response" to attempts to promote negotiations and a compromise with the Phnom Penh regime. In recent months Peking has sidestepped the question of negotiations and has conspicuously avoided underwriting the insurgents' political demands. Reflecting Peking's current approach, a 5 May NCNA report on the new four-man Phnom Penh council depicted "a wild scramble for power distribution" among the four leaders while neglecting to draw any implications for a political settlement.

NCNA's account of the 7 May banquet, which was "filled with a warm atmosphere of cordiality and friendship," noted that Chou and Sihanouk proposed toasts but did not give the substance of their

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remarks. As Sihanouk prepared to depart on his tour, the insurgent leaders in the interior resumed the hardline "appeals" to the people that had underscored the insurgents' intransigent mood last February after Sihanouk had indicated a more flexible stance in the immediate wake of the Vietnam agreement. Thus, military chief Khieu Samphan, in an appeal to youth under Phnom Penh's rule broadcast by the insurgents' radio on 4 May, forcefully reiterated opposition to the "cease-fire and national concord tricks" of the United States and the Lon Nol government. He declared bluntly that "our position is that there can be no genuine peace until the U.S. imperialist aggressors and all their foreign lackeys are completely driven from our beloved Cambodia and until we completely overthrow the archantinationist, archfascist, and archcorrupt gang of traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, In Tam, and their cohorts to the last man."

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## U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

## MOSCOW PICTURES PRESIDENT'S REPORT IN FAVORABLE LIGHT

Soviet and East European reaction to the Presidential report on U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's, transmitted to Congress on 3 May and discussed by Presidential adviser Kissinger in a press briefing on the 2d and a new conference on the 3d, has been light and generally low-keyed. Soviet comment has been restrained but on the whole favorable, East European more critical

Moscow has portrayed the report in a generally favorable light by focusing on the positive aspects of its assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations and by ignoring or playing down issues which remain troublesome. The initial TASS account on 4 May, carried in the central newspapers, was essentially straightforward. TASS played down the report's assessments on Europe and Indochina and restricted its criticism to the observation that the report pledged continued U.S. support for Israel while making no specific proposals for solving the Middle East issue. This point was not repeated in a generally friendly discussion of the report's implications for Soviet-U.S. bilateral relations in Moscow's domestic service roundtable on the 6th. On the Middle East, the broadcast simply suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States could make a "major contribution" to a settlement. TASS dispatches on Kissinger's 3 May press conference, carried in the central press on 6 May, also deemphasized the negative in failing to report his remarks on Indochina.

The main positive emphasis in the Moscow commentary has been on the prospects for U.S.-Soviet trade. This was a prominent theme in an international review article by Tomas Kolesnichenko, published in PRAVDA on 6 May. It was also stressed by one of the commentators in the 6 May roundtable program. He portrayed the report as calling for expanded cooperation with the Soviet Union, particularly in the area of trade and economic relations. He also described himself as "struck by the difference in concept, phrasing, and tone" in comparing the report with statements emanating from the White House only a few years ago.

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EAST EUROPE      In keeping with a pattern which emerged after Kissinger's 23 April "new Atlantic charter" speech, the East European countries have adopted a stronger tone than Moscow in discussing the Presidential report, generally praising it for its "realism" but at the same time criticizing it for being "inconsistent" and for not going far enough in applying the "basic theses" of peaceful coexistence to U.S. relations with the socialist countries. Whereas Moscow all but ignored the Indochina aspects of the report, perhaps in deference to Kissinger's presence in the Soviet capital, the East European commentators have taken the President to task for his "threats" against the DRV and the bombing of Cambodia. The comment--still limited at this point, with none yet available from Warsaw--has drawn favorable attention to the aspects of the report which concern the development of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Of available comment, only a Budapest radio broadcast on the 4th has referred to East European bilateral relations with the United States in this context, observing that the President's reference to the improvement in prospects for "more normal relations" with Hungary "found agreement in Budapest."

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## CHINA - U. S. - EUROPE

## PEKING CONVEYS INTEREST IN STRONG ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Peking has not yet commented on President Nixon's state of the world message, but the Chinese have registered their interest in the maintenance of a strong U.S.-backed Western alliance as a counterweight to Soviet power by their coverage of the President's series of meetings with European leaders as well as their treatment of Western policy statements. While taking note of trade and monetary problems between Washington and its Western allies, Peking has used selective replays of Western comment to convey the view that these problems must not be allowed to undermine broader security interests or to undercut the anti-Soviet deterrent. In fact, the Chinese have suggested that the West Europeans should be more accommodating to U.S. interests, particularly on the question of financial support for the U.S. military presence on the continent.

In keeping with its low-key treatment of U.S. policy statements, Peking reported Kissinger's 23 April address on a new Atlantic charter only in its domestic media, a practice followed also in the case of Secretary Laird's January defense report and the President's April message on the energy crisis. Peking's treatment of the Kissinger address suggested approval of the call for a new U.S.-West Europe relationship that would take into account the revival of Europe and the loss of the West's strategic superiority. The Chinese account cited Kissinger's stress on the continuing need for a strong defense against the East and his invocation of the President's determination to maintain the U.S. commitment to the West's defense. Peking also quoted Kissinger to the effect that Western leaders have the responsibility to subordinate economic disagreements to larger political objectives and that a spirit of reciprocity and mutual concession should prevail.

## WESTERN SUMMITS

Peking's treatment of the President's recent meetings with West European leaders has reflected the Chinese interest in the preservation of close ties between Washington and its allies vis-a-vis Moscow. Thus, Peking's account of the February Nixon-Heath meeting in Washington made a point of quoting Heath to the effect that a weakened U.S. defense presence in Europe "might give the Soviets the green light to extend their influence over the western part

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of the continent." It noted press reports on the two leaders' judgment that economic rivalry between the United States and West Europe "must not be allowed to weaken Atlantic solidarity on the eve of major East-West negotiations," and on the question of European support for the U.S. military presence it reported Heath's wish that West European countries would assume a larger share of defense costs.

Reflecting Peking's shift in the past year from a stress on European independence toward encouragement of U.S.-West Europe solidarity, Peking's coverage of Heath's visit highlighted his forthcoming comments on U.S.-British relations. Peking for years had encouraged London to break away from its "special relationship" with Washington and to join an independent Europe, which it saw as centered in the Common Market; when London finally gained entry into the EEC, the Chinese described this move as marking the end of the special relationship with Washington. In recent months, however, the Chinese not only have cultivated a good relationship with the British but have also seen the value of close Anglo-American relations. Accordingly, Peking's account of Heath's visit to Washington took note of his assertion that the "natural relationship" between Washington and London will remain intact and that Britain's membership in the Common Market will not change this relationship.

NCNA's brief coverage of Italian Prime Minister Andreotti's April meeting with President Nixon duly noted the trade and monetary "contradictions" involved in their talks, but Andreotti was quoted as stressing that these economic differences should be settled on a friendly basis and in the NATO framework. It was in the 4 May NCNA report on FRG Chancellor Brandt's Washington visit that broader East-West issues came through most clearly in Peking's treatment of U.S.-West Europe relations. NCNA cited Western press reports as noting that Brandt's visit came "just before Soviet revisionist leader Brezhnev's visit" to the FRG and the United States.\* According to the NCNA account, the joint statement on Brandt's visit "stressed the importance" of

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\* Peking's only other reference to a forthcoming Brezhnev visit to the United States appeared in a 27 April NCNA report of Soviet assurances that exit fees will not be levied on Jewish emigrants. NCNA quoted AFP for the judgment that the Soviet assurances to the United States show the importance Moscow attaches to Brezhnev's visit.

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preserving and consolidating the Atlantic alliance. Regarding Western relations with the Soviet Union and East Europe, NCNA quoted a passage on the importance of a unified alliance, an adequate U.S. military presence in Europe, and a credible deterrent as a basis for negotiations on force reduction and strategic arms limitation

The Chinese have made clear their concern to warn the West against letting down its guard at a time of East-West negotiations on arms and security. An NCNA dispatch from London on 4 May quoted a "recommendation on European security" adopted at a meeting of the West European Union as saying that West Europe's defense must be strengthened while negotiating with the Soviet Union. Earlier, NCNA's publicity on 16 February for President Nixon's call for 1973 to be the year of Europe noted that the President made this declaration during a meeting with the NATO supreme commander and that the two men subsequently conferred at the Pentagon with Defense Secretary Richardson and the JCS on NATO, force reduction in Central Europe, and European security. In its coverage of Kissinger's 23 April address on Europe, Peking quoted him as acknowledging growing concern over the possibility that negotiations between the superpowers may sacrifice the interests of Washington's allies and friends.

While showing concern over Western solidarity, Peking has reflected a different kind of solicitude for Moscow's allies. NCNA's report on the WEU meeting quoted the recommendation as saying Moscow's objectives in a European security conference are to secure international recognition of the present division of Europe and the Soviet "practice of armed intervention in the internal affairs of its allies." Peking reacted to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Rush's call for improved U.S. relations with East Europe with an NCNA report tacitly conveying approval of a move by the United States to lessen Moscow's hold on the area.

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## CHINA

## CHOU'S AUTHORITY ASSOCIATED WITH RUSTICATION PROGRAM

Chou En-lai's personal authority has been associated with the program for the rustication of youth in a 5 May NCNA dispatch from Urumchi on city youth who joined the production and construction corps in Sinkiang between 1963 and 1965. After citing the party Central Committee and Mao, NCNA noted that Chou had inspected the Sinkiang corps in July 1965 and had "encouraged" the youth to study the Marxist masters, devote themselves to construction of the frontier areas, and become "communist successors." In addition to invoking Chou's name, the dispatch linked rustication with a campaign that has strengthened Chou's authority by saying it was "particularly in the movement to criticize revisionism and rectify the style of work" that young people had made progress in studying and in integrating with workers and peasants. As in many of the provincial progress reports marking the current campaign to promote rustication, NCNA indicated the party's role in the program by citing the numbers of youth who had joined the party and the CYL.

The NCNA report was devoted to youth who were sent to Sinkiang in the period before the cultural revolution. The current rustication program represents an intensified campaign in a movement dating back to 1968, when an August RED FLAG article by Yao Wen-yuan signaled the regime's resolve to impose control on unruly youth who had served as shock troops in the cultural revolution.\* It is this program that is sometimes defended as one of the "revolutionary new things" born in recent years, but both its origins and the polemical context in which it is promoted indicate that it did not serve radical interests in the cultural revolution and is being used in the campaign against Lin Biao.

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\* The rustication movement received the highest sanction in a December 1968 Mao instruction saying that it is "very necessary" for educated youth to go to the countryside and calling for a mobilization of city youth for this purpose.

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Particularly illuminating in this connection is an Anhwei broadcast on 5 May recounting the role played by the province's workers in the criticism and rectification movement since the second plenum, a key turning point in the development of the Lin affair. Referring to the cultural revolution in a broadly inclusive sense, the broadcast said that during this revolution Mao succeeded in destroying "two bourgeois headquarters--that of Liu Shao-chi and that of swindlers like Liu Shao-chi" (meaning Lin). Having thus identified the two major purges of recent years, the broadcast proceeded to develop an indictment of Lin and his associates on various issues, including opposition to such "revolutionary new things" as the rustication program. Striking a defensive note that is often heard in provincial propaganda on rustication, the broadcast argued that a new thing may not be perfect in the beginning but possesses a powerful vitality by expressing a basic trend in society.\*

In other attacks on Lin, the broadcast denounced the radical tendency to overpoliticize affairs at the expense of production and called for a proper balance between politics and economics. It also played a key theme in the anti-Lin campaign by airing the charge of splitting and undermining the party. In a notably direct reference to the clash at the second plenum and the subsequent downfall of Lin and his military associates, the broadcast accused the "swindlers" of "ganging up with their henchmen for personal gains so as to be organizationally prepared for their counterrevolutionary restoration."

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\* A Kwangtung broadcast on the 3d stressed that rustication is a new thing that is "definitely not a makeshift measure."

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW AVOIDS TAKING SIDES IN REPORTAGE ON LEBANON FIGHTING

Sparse, cautious Soviet coverage of the armed conflict between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian fedayeen which erupted on 2 May has avoided placing blame on either side. Moscow did seem to hint at army responsibility, however, when it twice credited government leaders with prevailing on the military to cease their fire. Moscow has cited Lebanese sources for reports on actions by "subversive elements," and TASS on the 19th linked these elements with alleged attempts by "foreign intelligence services" to complicate army-fedayeen relations. Pointing to "instigatory pronouncements" by the Israeli chief of staff, TASS blamed "imperialist and Zionist circles" for provoking the clashes.

Successive dispatches in PRAVDA since the 4th have recounted actions by both sides while underscoring appeals by Lebanese "progressive forces" for vigilance and an end to the conflict. PRAVDA on the 7th called for a "clearcut formula" regulating relations between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian resistance movement and emphasized the negative effect of such clashes--a theme also played in Radio Moscow's only Arabic-language commentary on the conflict thus far, broadcast on the 4th.

Moscow has played down Syrian-Lebanese recriminations: TASS on the 8th reported the official Syrian statement declaring that Syrian efforts to help restore tranquility were thwarted because of the "stand assumed by the Lebanese authorities." But TASS did not mention the statement's assertion that the Beirut authorities were involved in a "foreign plot" against the Lebanese and Palestinian people, nor has Moscow reported the subsequent Lebanese military statement in rejoinder to Syria. Coverage of developments has noted mediatory activities by various Arab states, pointing to their "constructive contribution."

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## NOTES

CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA ON SALT TWO: An optimistic appraisal of the progress at SALT TWO was conveyed in two Czechoslovak commentaries during the brief Easter recess of the Geneva negotiations. ROLNICKE NOVINY's foreign affairs commentator M. Smolik in the 27 April issue and Bratislava radio commentator Ivan Horky on 5 May cited the brevity of the Easter break, the number and length of the meetings, and "especially" the meetings of the heads of the delegations as evidence that the talks were making progress. Horky forecast that some kind of partial agreement on strategic arms might be signed during Brezhnev's forthcoming U.S. visit, mentioning in this connection that both sides were "eminently interested" in restrictions on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) systems. Moscow itself has continued to avoid direct substantive comment on the negotiations.

MOSCOW ON CCD: Moscow has publicized no overall assessment of the spring session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva, which recessed on 26 April. Limited Soviet comment during the session did not reflect a noteworthy change in the Soviet public stance on the issue of a comprehensive test ban (CTB)--Soviet delegate Roshchin's 20 February opening remark calling for the participation of all nuclear powers in talks on a CTB. This shift from Moscow's previous noncommittal stance on the participation issue had been foreshadowed in the last serious, substantive discussion of CTB to appear in Soviet media, in an article by A. Alekseyev in the January INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Although there was speculation in the West at the time that the changed stance was motivated chiefly by a desire to score propaganda points at Peking's expense, Moscow made no special effort to highlight Chinese opposition to a CTB or to the CCD forum itself. On the contrary, Soviet references to the CTB issue continued to point to the U.S. position on on-site inspection as the main bar to a cessation of underground tests. And Moscow's comment during the session focused, as it had since agreement was reached on a Biological Weapons Convention last spring, on a treaty restricting chemical weapons as the CCD's priority issue.

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